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This article examines the experiences of  two North African and Middle Eastern refugee 
populations (Sahrawis and Palestinians) affected by the 2011 conflict in Libya who have 
remained largely invisible to the international community. The challenges that they have 
faced since the outbreak of  violence in February 2011, and the nature of  international 
responses to these challenges, highlight a range of  interconnected issues on both conceptual 
and practical dimensions. After outlining the scale and nature of  the internal and interna-
tional displacement arising from the 2011 conflict, and the history of  these refugees’ pres-
ence in Libya, the article explores whether Sahrawis and Palestinians can be categorised 
and conceptualised as ‘refugees’ in Libya, given their ‘voluntary’ migration to the country 
for educational and/or employment purposes. Drawing on a number of  historical exam-
ples of  protection activities by UNHCR for Sahrawi and Palestinian ‘refugee-migrants’, the 
article explores the potential applicability of  a framework that highlights ‘overlapping refu-
geedoms’ without negating refugees’ agency. Given that neither population has a ‘country 
of  origin’ or effective diplomatic protection, the article then explores which state and non-
state actors could be considered to be responsible for their protection in this conflict situa-
tion. Finally, analysing the ‘solutions’ promoted for Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees in this 
context leads to an assessment of  whether such responses can be considered to offer effec-
tive protection to these populations. Ultimately, the article examines a range of  protection 
gaps that emerge from these groups’ experiences during the 2011 North African uprisings, 
arguing in favour of  a critical assessment of  the protection mechanisms in place to support 
refugees who ‘voluntarily’ migrate for economic and educational purposes. Such an evalua-
tion is particularly important given policy-makers’ increasing interest in presenting mobility 
as a ‘fourth durable solution’.
1. Introduction
This article examines the experiences of  two Middle Eastern refugee pop-
ulations affected by the 2011 conflict in Libya: Sahrawis and Palestinians. 
 * Departmental Lecturer in Forced Migration, Refugee Studies Centre, University of  Oxford. 
An earlier version of  this article was presented at the ‘North Africa in Transition: Mobility, Forced 
Migration and Humanitarian Crises’ workshop (Refugee Studies Centre, 6 May 2011), and an earlier 
draft of  the article is available: New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper no 225 (UNHCR, 
Geneva, 2011). Thanks are due to the Editor, the anonymous reviewers, and the workshop participants 
who offered feedback on earlier versions of  the article.
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Both refugee communities and their respective political representatives, 
the Polisario Front and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), have 
received support from the Libyan government since the 1970s, includ-
ing through the provision of  scholarships to enable refugee children and 
youth to complete their studies in Libya. Whilst unexamined by academ-
ics to date, thousands of  Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees have studied 
in Libya throughout this period, although both groups faced expulsions 
from the country when political relations between Gaddafi and the 
Polisario/PLO were fraught. At the outbreak of  the conflict in Libya in 
February 2011, it is estimated that over 900 Sahrawi children and youth, 
100 Palestinian students, and between 50,000 and 70,000 Palestinian 
migrant workers were based in Libya. Their presence in Libya, the chal-
lenges they have faced since February 2011, and the nature of  inter-
national responses to these challenges, highlight a spectrum of  both 
conceptual and practical dilemmas. First, given their ‘voluntary’ migra-
tion to Libya for educational and/or employment purposes, are Sahrawis 
and Palestinians to be categorised and conceptualised as ‘refugees’ in 
Libya? Secondly, given that neither population has a ‘country of  origin’ 
or effective diplomatic protection, which state and non-state actors can 
be considered to be responsible for their protection in this conflict situ-
ation? Thirdly, do the ‘solutions’ promoted for Sahrawi and Palestinian 
refugees offer effective protection to these populations, and what protec-
tion gaps are revealed through these groups’ experiences during the 2011 
Arab Spring? 
In order to address these matters, the article is structured as follows. 
After a brief  overview of  the methodology underpinning this research, 
the scale and nature of  the displacement that has resulted from the con-
flict is introduced, highlighting the extent to which certain displaced 
populations have been hyper-visible, whilst others have effectively been 
rendered invisible to (and by) the international community. It then turns 
to the case-studies of  two of  these ‘invisible’ populations, outlining the 
history of  their presence in, and earlier expulsions from, Libya, and the 
extent to which their ‘voluntary’ presence there challenges popular con-
ceptualisations of  ‘refugeehood’ and ‘forced migration’. Despite concep-
tual challenges surrounding the simultaneity of  ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ 
migration, the article subsequently explores a range of  historical prec-
edents in which international agencies, including the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Relief  
and Works Agency (UNRWA), have offered protection to Sahrawi and 
Palestinian refugees who have engaged in ‘voluntary’ educational and/
or economic migration. Given international commitments to offer a 
‘continuity of  protection’ to refugees, the final section of  the article asks 
whether Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees who have been internally and 
internationally displaced by the conflict in Libya have received adequate 
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levels and forms of  protection, examining the nature and implications of  
the ‘solutions’ that have been proposed to date, and one which has yet to 
be fully activated.
1.1 Methodology
Given the total absence of  published literature documenting and explor-
ing the Sahrawi-Libyan scholarship programme, the Sahrawi case-study 
presented in this article is informed by three primary datasets that con-
textualise its development. First, reference is made to interviews con-
ducted as part of  a broader ESRC-funded doctoral research project 
with Sahrawi youth and adults in three main locations: Syria, Cuba, 
and the Algerian-based Sahrawi refugee camps. Secondly, fifty house-
hold interviews conducted in the Sahrawi refugee camps are drawn 
upon, which were undertaken for the University of  Oxford’s research 
project ‘Children and Adolescents in Sahrawi and Afghan Refugee 
Households: Living with the Effects of  Prolonged Armed Conflict and 
Forced Migration’ (managed by Prof  Chatty, and known as ‘SARC’).1 
Thirdly, the article refers to individual interviews that the author and 
Gina Crivello completed with fifty 7-12 year-old Sahrawi children in 
Spain, also as part of  the SARC project. These interviews are supple-
mented with an analysis of  recent Spanish and Sahrawi accounts per-
taining to the situation of  Sahrawi children and adolescents in the 2011 
conflict in Libya.2 
The Palestinian case-study in turn draws upon published materi-
als and testimonials to contextualise the presence and experiences of  
Palestinians in Libya from the 1970s onwards, in addition to telephone 
interviews, conducted in March-September 2011, with the relatives 
of  seven Palestinians affected by the conflict in Libya, and with two 
Palestinian families who were based in Benghazi at the outbreak of  the 
conflict. Telephone and electronic communication with UNHCR and 
International Committee of  the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) 
staff working on the identification and protection of  refugees affected by 
the conflict also provided invaluable insight into the challenges facing 
displaced populations and international agencies alike. An analysis of  
international agency (primarily UNHCR, ICRC and the Office for the 
Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) and Palestinian media 
reports vis à vis the situation of  Palestinians affected by the conflict in 
2011 is also presented throughout. 
 1 D Chatty, ‘Introduction’ in D Chatty (ed), Deterritorialised Afghan and Sahrawi Youth: Refugees from the 
Margins of  the Middle East (Berghahn Books, 2010), 1-34. Acknowledgments and thanks are due to Prof  
Chatty for granting access to the SARC dataset.
 2 A more detailed overview of  this case-study, analysing interview extracts, is presented in E Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, ‘Sahrawi-Libyan educational migration: reflections and expectations’ (in progress, available 
from the author upon request).
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1.2 Background: displacement and the 2011 Libyan conflict
Following the North African popular uprisings (known as the Arab 
Spring)3 that started in Tunisia in December 2010, anti-government 
protests in Libya rapidly escalated in February 2011 into a major con-
flict characterised by widespread attacks between pro- and anti-Gaddafi 
forces, a NATO-coordinated bombardment of  the country, and mass dis-
placement on both international and internal levels. Between February 
2011 and 9 May 2011, UNHCR estimated that over 750,000 people, 
including approximately 267,000 ‘third country nationals’ (that is, non-
Libyans), had crossed from Libya into neighbouring countries; of  these, 
circa 365,000 had fled to Tunisia and 270,830 to Egypt.4 A week later, the 
International Organisation of  Migration (IOM) reported that the num-
ber of  ‘migrants’ fleeing the violence had increased to 803,087, includ-
ing 271,215 third country nationals; from the outbreak of  violence to 16 
May 2011, over 136,000 non-Libyans had been ‘assisted’ by IOM and 
its partners to return to their countries of  origin. With reference to the 
scale of  internal displacement, in May 2011 the Libyan Committee for 
Humanitarian Aid and Relief  estimated that there were ‘200,000 inter-
nally displaced Libyans in Eastern Libya, of  which 58,000 live in sponta-
neous settlement sites’.5
As the violence continued over the course of  the summer, by late-
August/early-September UNHCR reported that over 990,000 people 
had crossed from Libya to Tunisia, and 468,000 had fled to Egypt via the 
Salloum border crossing.6 In addition to third country nationals evacu-
ated by the IOM and other international actors, the individuals based 
in UNHCR’s camps in Tunisia included ‘over 1,700 refugees and 2,100 
asylum-seekers’ while ‘some 1,300 persons of  concern to UNHCR, who 
cannot return home, remain[ed] at the [Libyan-Egyptian] border’.7 Given 
their particular protection needs, approximately 2,500 refugees had ‘been 
submitted for resettlement from Tunisia and Egypt to a total of  12 reset-
tlement countries’ by mid-September.8 However, despite the UNHCR’s 
Global Resettlement Solidarity Initiative being launched in April 2011, 
‘only 397 persons’ had been resettled from Tunisia and Egypt by mid-
September 2011.9
 3 Al-rabī' al-‘arabī is the term used in Arabic.
 4 UNHCR, ‘Update no 24: Humanitarian Situation in Libya and the Neighbouring Countries’ 
(10 May 2011); UNHCR, ‘Southern Tunisia Dehiba/Remada’, Update no 7 (14 May 2011).
 5 UNHCR, Update no 24, ibid.
 6 UNHCR EXCOM, ‘Update on UNHCR’s operations in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) – 2011’.
 7 Interestingly, the estimation of  IDPs in Libya remained the same between May 2011 and Sept 
2011: ‘over 200,000 internally displaced persons in Libya’, UNHCR EXCOM, ibid.
 8 UNHCR EXCOM, ibid.
 9 ibid.
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As reflected by this brief  overview, the conflict in Libya has central-
ised the multiple forms of  migration, mobility, immobility and displace-
ment that characterise the contemporary Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), revealing overlapping flows and categories of  individuals and col-
lectivities based in the country. These include migrant workers with work 
permits and those in an irregular status, with such migrants originating 
from across South-East, East and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
the MENA region. The diversity of  legal statuses held by these migrant 
workers is manifested not only in whether they hold work permits or are 
irregular migrants, but also with reference to their legal claims as citizens 
or refugees: while UNHCR had registered 8,000 refugees and 3,000 asy-
lum seekers in Libya before the conflict,10 thousands more have never reg-
istered as asylum seekers, and yet may have fled a diversity of  contexts that 
would correspond to the legal definitions applicable in Libya and neigh-
bouring countries (the 1969 Organisation of  African Unity regional refu-
gee definition and the 1951 Geneva Convention international definition 
of  a refugee). 
In line with the above, since the onset of  the violence in February 2011, 
different state and non-state actors have focused on particular groups that 
have been internally and internationally displaced. The European media 
has variously recognised the vulnerability of  Libyan and ‘third country 
nationals’ crossing the Libyan-Egyptian and Libyan-Tunisian borders, 
whilst drawing on hyperbolic rhetoric vis à vis the purported ‘threat’ of  
a mass influx of  Libyans, Tunisians and Sub-Saharan African migrants 
to European shores (especially to the Italian island of  Lampedusa). 
Governments from around the world embarked on evacuating their own 
citizens from the area, with greater or lesser interest, investment and suc-
cess. International organisations and UN agencies, including the IOM 
and the UNHCR, addressed a variety of  populations requiring interna-
tional assistance and protection to reach either their country of  origin 
(in the case of  migrant workers) or a safe third country (in the case of  
refugees and asylum seekers unable to return to their countries of  origin). 
While these groups of  citizens, migrants and refugees have been cen-
tralised by these and other actors, this article argues that certain popu-
lations’ existence has been overshadowed or even rendered invisible to 
and by much of  the international community. The remainder of  this 
article focuses on two of  these ‘invisible’ groups: Sahrawi and Palestinian 
refugee-students, and Palestinian refugee-migrants. It starts by providing 
a general overview of  the presence of  these two groups in Libya from the 
1970s to 2011. 
 10 UNHCR, ‘Revision to the UNHCR Supplementary Budget: The Libya Situation 2011’ (Donor 
Relations and Resource Mobilization Service, Mar 2011).
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2. Invisible refugees: Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees in 
Libya
2.1 A history of  Sahrawi refugees’ presence in Libya
Since the Sahrawi liberation movement, the Polisario Front, established 
the Sahrawi refugee camps in South-Western Algeria in 1975, thousands 
of  Sahrawi refugee children aged as young as 6 have left their refugee 
camp homes to study in Libya on full scholarships provided by Colonel 
Gaddafi. This has been part of  a broader transnational education pro-
gramme which Polisario developed to overcome the limited educational 
infrastructure in the refugee camps with the support of  ‘friendly’ nations 
including Libya, Cuba and Algeria.11 After Algeria, which provides the 
largest number of  scholarships to Sahrawi refugees, Libya has, until 
recently, been the second largest educational host for this refugee popu-
lation.12 Although no reliable statistics exist vis à vis this programme, the 
two large datasets underpinning this case-study reflect the proportion of  
refugees who have participated in this scheme. Of  fifty camp-based house-
holds interviewed by the SARC team, five interviewees had relatives who 
had studied in Libya (primarily sisters and daughters), while ten women 
(aged between 33 and 41) and four men (aged between 29 and 37) had left 
the camps between the ages of  6 and 8 to study in Libya in the 1970s and 
1980s. In turn, sixteen of  the fifty children aged between 7 and 12 inter-
viewed by Crivello and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh in Spain referred specifically to 
the Libyan education programme, with twelve girls and four boys outlining 
the experiences of  relatives (ranging from parents and aunts to siblings) 
who had studied there.13
 11 E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam and the Sahrawi Politics of  Survival (Syracuse 
University Press, 2013); E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘When the Self  becomes Other: Representations of  
gender, Islam and the politics of  survival in the Sahrawi refugee camps’ in D Chatty and B Findlay 
(eds), Dispossession and Displacement: Forced Migration in the Middle East and North Africa (OUP, 2010), 171-
96; E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘Paradoxes of  Refugees’ Educational Migration: Promoting self-sufficiency 
or renewing dependency?’ (2011) 47 Comparative Education 433-47; D Chatty, E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
and G Crivello, ‘Identity With/out Territory: Sahrawi Refugee Youth in Transnational Space’ in 
Chatty and Findlay (eds), above, 35-82.
 12 Chatty, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Crivello, ibid, 59. According to a female Polisario representative 
who studied in Cuba, in 2003 there were ‘2,000 students in Libya, 3,000 in Algeria, and 1,400 in 
Cuba’: F Coggan, ‘Saharawi leader tours New Zealand’, The Militant, 23 June, 2003. While the precise 
figures may have been inflated, the proportion of  students appears to be consistent with the informa-
tion provided by interviewees and the author’s broader research vis à vis the Cuban-Sahrawi educa-
tion programme: E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘Representing Sahrawi Refugees’ “Educational Displacement” 
to Cuba: Self-sufficient agents or manipulated victims in conflict?’ (2009) 22 JRS 323-50; Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, When the Self, ibid.
 13 Fourteen young men, interviewed by the author in Syria, Cuba and the refugee camps, also referred 
to the different types and fluctuating nature of  Libya’s support, although, given their participation in 
the Cuban and Syrian education programmes, they had not themselves studied in Libya.
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It is worth noting that Sahrawi children have not been eligible for 
primary-level scholarships since 1983, a year which marked a hiatus in 
the diplomatic and solidarity ties of  the Polisario and Libya, following 
Libya’s rapprochement with Morocco in 1983, and the eventual signing 
of  the Moroccan-Libyan treaty of  Arab-African Unity in August 1984.14 
Due to this political conflict, Sahrawi children were expelled from Libya 
in 1984,15 and the scholarship programme, which was eventually reiniti-
ated in the late-1980s (when Libya protested King Hassan’s talks with the 
Israeli Prime Minister in July 1986), was designed solely for secondary and 
tertiary level students. Between the 1990s and early-2011, Libya offered 
scholarships to hundreds of  (and at times over a thousand) Sahrawi youth a 
year. Throughout this period, the majority of  students have typically been 
female,16 with teenage girls and young women in their early-20s reportedly 
accounting for the majority of  over 900 Sahrawi refugees who were wait-
ing to be evacuated from Libya at the end of  February 2011. In contrast 
to the late-1970s and early-1980s, when Sahrawi boarding schools were 
located across the country,17 in 2011, two boarding schools remained in 
Tripoli and Benghazi; other young Sahrawis were studying in Universities 
across the country.18 
As suggested above, the presence of  Sahrawi refugee students in Libya 
in 2011 has been largely invisible within the English-language media.19 
Only one reference has been made by international agencies, when the 
UNHCR noted, on 6 March 2011, that the UN refugee agency had been 
informed of  (rather than responsible for) the successful evacuation of  743 
Sahrawi refugee children and youth by the Algerian authorities (as the 
Sahrawi’s host state). Indeed, it is notable that, although UNHCR records 
the number of  Sahrawi refugee children and youth studying in Cuba,20 
UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks and Statistical Overviews have never docu-
mented the number of  Sahrawi refugees in Libya.21This raises the ques-
tion, explored in greater detail below, of  whether UNHCR was in fact 
 14 See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, above n 2.
 15 35 year-old, male SARC interviewee.
 16 Interviews in Syria and Cuba; this is also in line with demographic data from SARC and Madrid 
Interviews. See also Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, above n 2.
 17 SARC interviews.
 18 ‘Testimonios desde Libya’, El País (23 Feb 2011); A Muñoz, ‘“Las abandonaron a su suerte” Mas de 7.000 
estudiantes saharauis viven las revueltas atrapados en los dos internados libios que tienen el RASD en Trípoli y Bengasi’, 
El País (4 Mar 2011).
 19 Numerous reports, which are unsubstantiated to date and vehemently refuted by Polisario rep-
resentatives, have claimed that Sahrawi mercenaries were contracted by Gaddafi in 2011: see C 
Coughlin, ‘Libya: Col Gaddafi “has spent £2.1m on mercenaries”’, The Telegraph (20 Apr 2011); SPS, 
‘“It is neither the tradition nor the national interest of  the POLISARIO Front to get involved in the 
sad situation in Libya”, says Sahrawi diplomat’, Sahrawi Press Service (12 Mar 2011).
 20 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Representing Sahrawi Refugees, above n 12; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, When the 
Self, above n 11.
 21 UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks and Statistical Overviews, 1995-2009.
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aware of  the presence, number, whereabouts and protection needs of  
these refugee children and youth. 
In contrast to this general invisibility, the Spanish media, including 
Spain’s national newspaper El País, has centralised the experiences of  
Sahrawis in Libya, drawing upon Sahrawi students’ testimonials, along-
side those of  Libyan citizens and third country migrant-workers, to outline 
conditions in the country.22 For instance, the experiences of  two Sahrawi 
young women, aged 17 and 19, who had studied in Libya since they were 
12, were relayed to/by El País through two main news articles,23 specifying 
that:
All of  the Libyan personnel in the centre [the Sahrawi boarding school in 
Benghazi] abandoned the institution when the conflict started between the secu-
rity forces and the demonstrators. Not even the cooks remained. They left [the 
girls], without food, until the people on the street started to feed them out of  
charity.24 
Such a focus demonstrates the extent to which different actors have pri-
oritised the protection needs of  different migrant and refugee popula-
tions, in this case in part due to former colonial ties (Spain occupied the 
Western Sahara from 1884 until its departure from the territory in 1976) 
and broader Sahrawi-Spanish solidarity networks revolving around refu-
gee children.25
2.2 Palestinian refugees in Libya
Predating the Sahrawi-Libyan education programme, Libya offered mul-
tifaceted support to Palestinian refugees from the early-1970s, including 
opening a PLO office in Tripoli, and offering scholarships for the comple-
tion of  their secondary and tertiary studies. At the start of  the 2011 con-
flict, 104 Palestinian refugee-students were reportedly attending university 
and military academies in Libya through the scholarship programme.26 
Although all these refugee-students had been evacuated from Libya by 
early March 2011, at least one Palestinian refugee-student (Khan Younis, 
from the Gaza strip, who had been studying engineering at Misrata 
University) is reported to have been killed in Libya during the violence. 
The particular vulnerability of  this cohort of  young refugees was high-
lighted by his sister: 
 22 ‘Testimonios desde Libya’, above n 18.
 23 ibid; Muñoz, above n 18. 
 24 Muñoz, above n 18, author’s translation.
 25 See below and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees, above n 11; also Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 
‘Histories of  Displacement: Intersections between ethnicity, gender and class’ (2011) 16 Journal of  
North African Studies 31-48.
 26 ‘Last group of  Palestinian students leave Libya’, Ma’an News Agency (7 Mar 2011).
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there is a dangerous level of  incitement against the Palestinians in Libya … the 
mercenaries of  the Qaddafi regime are responsible for several attacks against the 
Palestinians in the country.27
Other news reports asserted that Gaddafi’s forces had ‘detained Palestinians 
studying at a military college in the northwestern city [of  Misrata] after 
they refused to join the pro-regime forces’.28 
Unlike the Sahrawi refugee-students, who all originated from the same 
location (the Algerian-based refugee camps), Palestinian refugee-students 
had been habitually resident in a wide variety of  countries/territories 
before travelling to Libya to take up their scholarships: including Gaza 
and the West Bank, Egypt, and the main Palestinian host countries in the 
region (Lebanon, Jordan and Syria). As discussed in detail below, such a 
diversity of  points of  ‘origin’ across the MENA region raise a number of  
difficulties when attempting to secure effective protection for Palestinians 
facing secondary displacement from Libya. 
While Palestinians make up a much smaller number of  refugee-stu-
dents than their Sahrawi counterparts, thousands of  Palestinian ‘refugee-
migrant-workers’ have lived in Libya since the 1970s and continue to do 
so. Accounts documenting the labour migration of  Palestinian workers to 
Libya draw on Palestinian and Libyan statistics to estimate that approx-
imately 5,000 Palestinians were present in Libya in 1970,29 23,759 in 
1981,30 and 29,207 by the end of  1992.31 With reference to the gender of  
those present in the 1980s, Tahir draws on Palestinian statistics to estimate 
that in 1980/1981 there were approximately 14,600 Palestinian males and 
9,100 Palestinian females present in Libya.32 Following the mass expul-
sion of  Palestinians from Libya in 1995-1996 (see below), the number of  
Palestinians decreased dramatically to approximately 17,000 in 1996,33 
increasing over the course of  the following decade to an estimated total of  
between 50,000 and 70,000 by the beginning of  2011. While these figures 
are contested, it is clear that thousands of  Palestinians have lived in Libya 
 27 Cited in IMEMC, ‘Palestinian Student Killed by Mercenaries in Libya’, International Middle East 
Media Centre (26 Feb 2011).
 28 ‘Gadhafi forces detain Palestinian students’, Ma’an News Agency (2 Mar 2011).
 29 I Abu-Lughod, ‘Educating a Community in Exile: The Palestinian Experience’ (1973) 2 Journal 
of  Palestine Studies 94-111.
 30 PA Smith, ‘The Palestinian Diaspora, 1948-1985’ (1986) 15 Journal of  Palestine Studies 90-108, 
90.
 31 Palestine Red Crescent Society, The Situation of  the Palestine Refugees in Diaspora: Demographic, Socio-
Economic Characteristics and Health Status (PRCS, 1994), 5.
 32 J Tahir, ‘An Assessment of  Palestinian Human Resources: Higher Education and Manpower’ 
(1985) 14 Journal of  Palestine Studies 32-53, 42.
 33 ‘The Palestinian Crisis in Libya 1994-1996: Interview with Professor Bassem Sirhan’ (2010) 45 
al-Majdal, Forced Secondary Displacement: Palestinian Refugees in the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Jordan, and 
Libya.
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(either with work permits or in an irregular status) since the 1980s and 
1990s.34 
It is notable that, despite the long-standing presence of  such significant 
numbers of  Palestinian refugees in Libya, the experiences of  Libya-based 
Palestinians, and of  Palestinians expelled from Libya at different points 
between the 1970s and the present, have remained largely unexplored.35 
More precisely, none of  the existing academic and NGO references per-
taining to Libya-based Palestinians refer to the scholarship programme, 
and only a small number focus on, or refer in passing to, Palestinian 
migrant-workers. While these ‘categories’ of  Palestinians have been under-
studied, arguably the most ‘invisible’ status held by Palestinians in Libya 
is that of  ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘refugee’, with an absence of  academic or 
policy literature engaging with the existence of  Palestinians as refugees 
in the country. Indeed, the cases referred to in this article as Sahrawi and 
Palestinian ‘refugee-students’ and Palestinian ‘refugee-migrant-workers’, 
raise a number of  pivotal conceptual questions, including the continued 
applicability of  the term ‘refugee’ in contexts of  voluntary economic or 
educational migration.
3. Migrants, ‘internally displaced refugees’ or ‘second 
time refugees’?
Throughout the conflict in 2011, Palestinian and Sahrawi refugee-students 
and Palestinian refugee-migrant-workers have variously become ‘internally 
stuck refugees’ and ‘internally displaced refugees’ unable to leave Libya, 
while hundreds if  not thousands have also experienced secondary interna-
tional displacement from Libya to Egypt or Tunisia.36 Two key intersecting 
questions arise in this respect: first, how to conceptualise Libya’s role as a 
‘host’ country for these groups before the conflict; and, secondly, how to 
 34  OCHA, ‘Libyan Arab Jamahiriya – Crisis Situation Report No 27’ (19 Apr 2011); telephone 
interview with Palestinian woman based in Benghazi, 8 Apr 2011. Witness testimonies refer to attacks 
on Palestinian households in Benghazi; further research is required to contextualise the experiences of  
Palestinian students and migrant workers during different phases of  the conflict.
 35  Sirhan’s personal testimony of  having lived in Libya for three years in the early- to mid-1990s is 
drawn upon by both al-Majdal, above n 33, and BT Sirhan and A Khaleq, ‘The Palestinians in Libya, 
Testimonies: The Crisis of  the Palestinian Community in Libya: Two Years of  Suffering’ (1996/1997) 
IX The Palestine Yearbook of  International Law 363-74; Libya-based Palestinians are mentioned pas-
sim by A Shiblak, ‘Residency Status and Civil Rights of  Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries’ (1996) 
25 Journal of  Palestine Studies 36-45; AF Kassim, ‘The Palestinians: From Hyphenated to Integrated 
Citizenship’ in NA Butenschon, U Davis and M Hassassian (eds), Citizenship and the State in the Middle 
East: Approaches and Applications (Syracuse University Press, 2000), 201-24; SM Akram, ‘Palestinian refu-
gees and their legal status: Rights, politics, and implications for a just solution’ (2002) XXXI Journal 
of  Palestine Studies 36-51; B Goddard, ‘UNHCR and the International Protection of  Palestinian 
Refugees’ (2009) 28 RSQ 475-510.
 36  In the case of  Palestinian refugees, this may in fact have accounted for perhaps even tertiary, qua-
ternary, quinary, or senary displacement (see below).
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define and classify the status of  Sahrawis and Palestinians whilst in, and 
when attempting to leave, this country during the Arab Spring.
According to Sirhan, a Palestinian sociologist who lived in Libya for 
three years before Gaddafi expelled thousands of  Palestinians in 1995 (see 
below):
Libya is not a host country for Palestinians (i.e. Palestinians are not refugees there), as is the 
case with Lebanon, Syria and Jordan; it is rather one which imports skilled labour 
… therefore the residency of  any Palestinian in Libya is based on a personal or 
individual contract with the state and its institutions, or with Libyan companies or 
foreign companies operating in Libya.37
In this statement, Sirhan unequivocally asserts that Libya is not a ‘host 
country’ in the sense of  being an ‘asylum state’ for Palestinians, ‘as is the 
case’ in other MENA countries that fall under UNRWA’s areas of  opera-
tion. This leads us to ask how we might define this hosting location: if  it 
is not a ‘host country’ could it be conceptualised as a ‘state of  employ-
ment’ or a ‘state of  education’, or perhaps even as a ‘transit state’ inhabited 
between periods in asylum states in the region? In the context of  Sahrawi 
children and youth who had been based in Libya for up to a decade, the 
denomination of  Libya as an ‘educational hosting context’ may be accu-
rate given the terms of  their presence in the country. Such definitions, 
however, are particularly complicated in the case of  Palestinian workers 
who have lived in Libya for over twenty years, since Libya was arguably 
their ‘place of  habitual residence’ at the outbreak of  the conflict. 
Nonetheless, Sirhan not only argues that Libya is ‘not a host country 
for Palestinians’, but explicitly claims that ‘Palestinians are not refugees there’. 
On the one hand, such a claim may be understandable in so far as Libya 
has considered Palestinians to be ‘Arab citizens residing in Libya’ rather 
than ‘refugees’, in line with its Reservation to article 1 of  the Protocol for 
the Treatment of  Palestinians in Arab States. Indeed, the vast majority 
of  Palestinians in Libya had neither applied for asylum in Libya nor been 
admitted to Libya due to their refugee status per se; as such, Palestinians’ 
status in the eyes of  the Libyan government was not that of  ‘refugees’, 
but rather that of  ‘skilled labourers’. Whilst unrecognised by Sirhan, it is 
important to note that broader debates persist vis à vis the effective status 
of  Palestinians within the region, including in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon; 
although Sirhan asserts that Palestinians are refugees in these countries, 
these and other states (including Egypt) typically refuse to consider 
Palestinians to be refugees. This struggle is noted by Kagan, who recog-
nises that Palestinian refugees ‘are increasingly asking to be recognized as 
just refugees, full stop’, thereby highlighting the disconnect that may exist 
between official UNHCR and UNRWA declarations vis à vis Palestinians’ 
 37  Sirhan, quoted in al-Majdal, above n 33, 44 (emphasis added).
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status as refugees within and outside of  UNRWA’s areas of  operations in 
the MENA region, and a variety of  state and non-state practices that fail 
to offer them meaningful recognition and protection as refugees per se.38 
On the other hand, the de-classification of  Palestinians as ‘refugees’ and 
their re-classification as ‘skilled labourers’ simultaneously risks embracing 
a monolithic interpretation of  identity and legal status that elides the mul-
tiple vulnerabilities and protection concerns held by different groups of  
people in diverse geopolitical contexts. In effect, the de-classification of  
Palestinians as refugees in this way appears to substantiate the interpreta-
tion that refugees who utilise their agency to find employment, or who 
voluntarily migrate to a third country to pursue their education, automati-
cally risk losing the legitimate claim to ‘refugee’ status. This equation has 
many dangers, including the potential negation of  refugees’ capacity to 
be perceived to be active agents as refugees, and more specific practical 
implications such as potentially losing a variety of  rights and types of  inter-
national protection that (should) accompany refugee status. 
This case-study therefore prompts the broader question of  whether ref-
ugees who ‘voluntarily’ migrate for economic and educational purposes 
are conceptualised by different actors as being ‘worthy’ of  international 
protection. Indeed, as researchers and policy-makers increasingly focus on 
the blurred nature of  categories such as ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migra-
tion, and explore the dynamics of  the asylum-migration nexus,39 these ref-
ugees embody the overlaps of  being legally recognised as refugees under 
international definitions, and simultaneously being educational/economic 
migrants who have decided to travel outside of  their country of  habitual 
residence or first country of  asylum. The Palestinian and Sahrawi children, 
 38  M Kagan, ‘The (Relative) Decline of  Palestinian Exceptionalism and its Consequences for Refugee 
Studies in the Middle East’ (2009) 22 JRS 417-38, 434. The disconnect referred to appears to emerge 
between the lived experiences of  many Palestinians, who struggle to be recognised and to be offered 
meaningful protection as refugees across the region, and the official position that, ‘Palestinians remain 
refugees whether they come here [to Libya] for economic reasons or not’: Emmanuel Gignac, cited 
in ‘The Middle East’s “Invisible Refugees”’ IRIN (31 Jan 2011). The official position of  a continuity 
of  protection is consistent with mainstream interpretations of  art 1D, in which ‘the phrase “[w]hen 
such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason” should be interpreted to include situations when 
Palestinian refugees have voluntarily left the UNRWA areas’ (emphasis added): Goddard, above n 35, 
496. However, the tension between theory and practice has nonetheless been recognised by UNHCR 
with reference to the position of  Palestinians in Libya: ‘Technically, there is no protection gap … If  
you’re a Palestinian in Libya, you do fall under UNHCR. It shouldn’t be an issue mandate-wise or legal-
wise. But in practice, Palestinians being so political and all these sensitivities being around them, if  we apply 
our mandate which includes [certain] solutions [ie, resettlement], there are issues’: Gignac, cited in IRIN, 
above (emphasis added).
 39  For instance, K Long, ‘Home alone? A review of  the relationship between repatriation, mobility 
and durable solutions for refugees’, UNHCR Evaluation Paper (2010); K Long, ‘Extending Protection? 
Labour migration and durable solutions for refugees’, New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper 
Series, no 176 (UNHCR 2009); and N Van Hear, R Brubaker and T Bessa, ‘Managing mobility for human 
development: the growing salience of  mixed migration’, Human Development Research Paper Series, no 19202 
(2009).
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adolescents and adults referred to in this article thereby reflect the poten-
tial simultaneity of  being a ‘voluntary’ and an ‘involuntary migrant’, and 
of  the specific protection needs of  those referred to in this article as ‘refu-
gee-migrant-workers’ and ‘refugee-students’. Recognising the specificities 
of  these protection concerns is particularly important in light of  increas-
ing policy support for migration and mobility as a ‘fourth durable solu-
tion’;40 ‘voluntary migration’ may lead to increased risk, rather than being 
an effective and durable solution per se. 
In fact, this article argues that there are multiple reasons for purpose-
fully highlighting the refugee status of  Palestinians and Sahrawis in Libya, 
leading not only to the recognition of  the potential simultaneity of  being 
both ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migrants, but also the potential benefits of  a 
new conceptual categorisation of  ‘overlapping-refugeeness’.
First, from 1996 onwards, UNHCR’s statistical unit has documented 
the total number of  Palestinian refugees registered by the agency in Libya, 
indicating the number of  new asylum applications made, and the total 
number of  Palestinians receiving assistance from the organisation. One 
key reason underpinning the increased presence of  UNHCR registered 
Palestinians from 1996 to the present is discussed below.
As evidenced in Table 1, UNHCR has recognised the presence and 
both the protection and assistance needs of  thousands of  Palestinian refu-
gees in Libya, noting that of  the 943 Palestinian applications for asylum in 
Libya in 2008, 544 were offered 1951 Geneva Convention Refugee Status, 
and 344 were granted complementary protection (sixty-three cases were 
pending at the end of  the year).41 
It is worth noting the discrepancies between the figures presented in 
various UNHCR reports, as reflected both in the divergent total popula-
tions documented in Tables 1 and 2, and in the apparent inconsistency 
between the presence of  over 8,000 Palestinian refugees registered with 
UNHCR throughout the 2000s (with the number increasing each year 
between 2000 and 2004/5), and UNHCR’s assertion that in 2011 a total 
of  approximately 8,000 refugees and 3,000 asylum seekers of  all nation-
alities were registered with the agency. An important question is therefore 
raised regarding the (in)visibility of  thousands of  Palestinians as refugees 
based in Libya within statistics pertaining to the contemporary conflict, 
with subsequent implications apropos protection.
UNHCR data also provide a pertinent insight into the demographic 
composition of  Palestinian refugees of  concern to the agency through its 
records of  new asylum applications in the country at the end of  1996, 
1998 and 2000 (Table 2 and Chart 1).
 40 Long, Home alone, ibid.
 41 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2008, 117.
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This demographic overview highlights the large number of  Palestinian 
refugee children present in Libya between 1996 and 2000, suggesting that 
hundreds if  not thousands of  Palestinian children and youth will have 
remained in Libya throughout the following decade. Interestingly, the 
high proportion of  Palestinian girls closely mirrors the gender and age 
of  Sahrawi refugee-students based in Libya during the same period. The 
demographic composition of  these populations must also be centralised in 
an ongoing assessment of  the protection needs of  these individuals, fami-
lies and groups.
A second reason for highlighting, rather than potentially erasing, these 
refugees’ refugee status per se arises when we recognise that thousands of  
Palestinians who were born as refugees and registered by UNRWA as refu-
gees at birth in Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan or Egypt, in this 
instance embody ‘overlapping refugeedoms’, having applied for and hav-
ing been granted asylum in Libya (as per Table 1). For instance, in 1998 
UNHCR-Libya received new asylum applications from 350 Palestinians 
from the Gaza Strip.42 Just as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Antònio Gutteres, argues that Somali, Eritrean and Ivorian asylum seekers 
 42  UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2000.
Chart 1
Gender and age of  new Palestinian asylum applicants in 
Libya in 1996, 1998 and 2000*
* Compiled by author from UNHCR 1997, 1999 and 2001 Statistical Yearbooks 
and Statistical Overviews
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formerly based in Libya who have sought safety in Europe ‘were refugees 
twice’,43 so too can Palestinian refugees who attempted to seek sanctuary 
from the conflict in Libya be categorised as ‘double refugees’ (a phrase 
used by Sachs)44 or as ‘second time refugees’ (a term coined by Shiblak),45 
to denote the multiple experiences of  displacement characterising certain 
refugee populations.46 While the expulsion of  Palestinians from Libya in 
1995 has been denominated as ‘secondary displacement’, in the case of  
Palestinian refugees displaced in 2011, this may in fact have accounted 
for tertiary, quaternary, quinary, or even senary displacement. Equally, it 
can therefore be argued that they may experience secondary, tertiary or 
quaternary ‘refugeehood’, with overlapping vulnerabilities across time and 
space, and accentuated, rather than erased, protection needs. 
Although the overlapping refugeehood of  Palestinians explicitly regis-
tered as refugees by UNHCR may be particularly clear in this respect, 
it can equally be maintained that such refugee status determination pro-
cesses do not make someone a refugee but, rather, offer an official dec-
laration that confirms a legal status/identity in the eyes of  states and 
international organisations.47 As such, Palestinians present in Libya may 
‘be’ 1951 Geneva Convention refugees even if  they have not applied for 
asylum, by virtue of  inherently fulfilling all of  the legal criteria that would 
(or should, in the absence of  procedural errors and the misapplication of  
law) lead to an official declaration of  their de jure refugee identity.
A third reason for arguing that Sahrawi and Palestinians’ refugeehood 
should be centralised in spite of  the ‘voluntary’ nature of  their economic 
and/or educational migration to Libya, leading to the implementation of  
proactive protection mechanisms, derives from examples of  the ways in 
which the UN has addressed the protection needs of  both of  these groups 
in the past. 
4. Precedents of  protection (and histories repeating 
themselves)
Two key examples centralise the continuity of  ‘refugeehood’ and the need 
for international protection in contexts of  so-called voluntary migration. 
 43  This statement was made in relation to the tragic drowning of  these individuals: they were ‘refu-
gees twice’ as ‘they fled war and persecution in their own counties and now, in their attempt to seek 
safety in Italy, they tragically lost their lives’: ‘UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees and UNHCR 
Goodwill Ambassador shocked by devastating boat tragedy’, UNHCR Press Release (6 Apr 2011).
 44  A Sachs, ‘Apartheid, Destabilization and Refugees’ (1989) 2 JRS 491-501.
 45  Shiblak invokes this concept to refer to Palestinians from Gaza who were displaced both in 1948 
and 1967. Shiblak, above n 35, 40.
 46  See also E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and YM Qasmiyeh, ‘Asylum-Seekers and Refugees from the Middle 
East and North Africa: Negotiating politics, religion and identity in the UK’ (2010) 23 JRS 294-314.
 47  E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘Relocating: The Asylum Experience in Cairo’ (2006) 8 Interventions: 
International Journal of  Postcolonial Studies 295-318.
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4.1 UNHCR and the protection of  Sahrawi educational 
migrants in Cuba
The first example pertains to the UN’s active involvement in monitoring 
the protection situation of  Sahrawi youth who have engaged in volun-
tary educational migration to Cuba, and yet have continued to be con-
sidered refugees in need of  protection by UNHCR whilst studying in the 
Caribbean.48 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Cuban government 
was entirely responsible for these children; however, since Cuba has full 
diplomatic relations with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (the 
Sahrawi state-in-exile whose birth was declared by the Polisario Front in 
1976), Cuba considers Sahrawi students to be citizens of  this ‘state’, rather 
than refugees per se during their stay on the island.49 However, since 1994, 
the Cuban government (facing major difficulties as a result of  the US-led 
Embargo and the fall of  the Soviet bloc) explicitly requested that UNHCR 
become involved in overseeing the arrival and presence of  Sahrawi chil-
dren on the island. Since then, whilst explicitly noting that Sahrawi chil-
dren are present voluntarily on the island, UNHCR has supervised the 
protection situation of  Sahrawi children in Cuba, providing a small sti-
pend to all students, in addition to regularly monitoring their situation and 
publishing Information Notes confirming that they are being treated in 
accordance to international standards of  treatment and care, as required 
by the 1989 Convention on the Rights of  the Child.50
4.2 Palestinian ‘secondary displacement’ from Libya 
The second example is the most pertinent in light of  the recent conflict, 
and provides the main reason for the dramatic increase in the number of  
Palestinians applying for asylum after 1996. 
As a means of  protesting the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s signing 
of  the Oslo Accords, in September 1995 Gaddafi threatened to expel all the 
estimated 30,000 Palestinian ‘migrant workers’ based in Libya at the time.51 
It is estimated that 13,000 Palestinians were deported over the course of  the 
following eight months, with 17,000 reportedly remaining in the country by 
May 1996.52 In September 1995, the Salloum border saw the establishment 
of  Mukhayyam Al-Awda (the Return Camp) by Gaddafi’s forces. Despite the 
 48  Interview, UNHCR official, Habana, Nov 2006.
 49  See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees, above n 11. 
 50  Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘Representing Sahrawi Refugees’, above n 12; UNHCR, ‘Summary Update 
of  Machel Study: Follow-up activities in 2001-2002’ (Refugee Children Coordination Unit, 2003); 
UNHCR, ‘Information Note: Western Saharan refugee students in Cuba’ (Sept 2005); also Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, ‘Education, Migration and Internationalism: Situating Muslim Middle Eastern and North 
African students in Cuba’ (2009) 15 The Journal of  North African Studies 137-55. 
 51  ‘[A]s per a census conducted by the Libyan Foreign Security Agency in 1995 … the number of  
Palestinians in Libya stood at 30,000’: Sirhan, in al-Majdal, above n 33, 45.
 52  al-Majdal, ibid, 47.
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name of  the camp reflecting Gaddafi’s invocation of  the Palestinians’ Right 
to Return (as enshrined in UN Resolutions 194 and 3236), in September 
1995, 32 Palestinians were stranded in the ‘Egyptian-Libyan no-man’s land’, 
by October 1995 approximately 900 Palestinians were stuck at the bor-
der, and over 200 remained by January 2006, unable to leave Libya and 
enter Egyptian territory.53 Unlike the 2011 conflict, which saw thousands 
of  Palestinians proactively attempting to leave Libya in order to escape the 
violence, in 1995-1996 a large proportion of  Palestinian ‘migrant workers’ 
were forcibly collected, transported and deported by Gaddafi’s forces; by the 
end of  September 1995 alone, 1,500 Palestinians had been transported to 
the Tubrok Camp in the north-east of  Libya, in preparation for deportation 
by land (via the Salloum border) or sea.54 
Indeed, over 600 Palestinians with Syrian and Jordanian identity doc-
uments were expelled by sea and were eventually collected by a Syrian 
ship (having initially been refused permission to land in Cyprus), leading 
to 608 Palestinians returning to Syria and thirteen to Jordan.55 However, 
in addition to major challenges in crossing into Egypt, even when hold-
ing Egyptian travel documents,56 and restrictions on entering Gaza (with 
thirty-six Palestinians stuck at the Rafah crossing in September 1995 
alone),57 most countries in the region under UNRWA’s area of  operations 
introduced further ‘restrictions on the entry of  Palestinians, even on those 
who had right of  residence’.58 The Lebanese authorities, for instance, 
issued Decree No 478, which entered into effect on 10 September 1995, 
requiring that all Palestinians who had been refugees in Lebanon from 
1948 obtain an exit visa from Lebanon and an entry visa from Lebanese 
diplomatic missions.59 Both of  these bureaucratic procedures were evi-
dently impossible for Palestinians forcibly taken to the border, and, as 
noted by Kassim, ‘these measures are, in effect, a nullification of  [these 
Palestinians’] residence and travel rights’.60 Facing such hostile environ-
ments on both sides of  the Libyan border, in 1995/1996 thousands of  
Palestinians recognised that they were simultaneously ‘internally stuck’, 
unable and unwilling to attempt to access other UNRWA states, and in 
need of  international protection. Noting their effective statelessness61 and 
their inability to return to a safe ‘country of  origin’ or alternative ‘location 
 53  ibid; Goddard, above n 35, 502.
 54  al-Majdal, ibid.
 55  ibid.
 56  al-Majdal, ibid, 46-7; Shiblak, above n 35, 40.
 57  Similar restrictions were faced by Gazans with Egyptian identity documents following the mass 
expulsions of  Palestinians in 1991 following the Gulf  War: al-Majdal, ibid.
 58  al-Majdal, ibid, 47.
 59  Kassim, above n 35, 216.
 60  ibid; also Shiblak, above n 35, 40; al-Majdal, above n 33, 47.
 61  Al-Majdal, ibid; Shiblak, ibid, 44.
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of  habitual residence’ in the region, thousands of  Palestinians applied for 
asylum within Libya. 
Throughout this period, ‘UNHCR provided assistance to those at the 
[Egyptian-Libyan] border and monitored their situation until they were 
allowed to return to Libya in 1997’.62 On 29 September 1995, UNHCR 
and UNRWA issued a joint statement on the ‘Forced Movement of  
Palestinians from Libya’,63 being the first time that the two UN refugee 
agencies had ‘issued a joint press release on a matter of  mutual concern’.64 
In addition to lobbying neighbouring countries to allow Palestinians hold-
ing valid documentation to enter their former-host states, as noted above, 
UNHCR witnessed an increased number of  applications for asylum from 
Palestinians in Libya who had a well founded fear of  attempting to relocate 
within the region. UNRWA’s involvement in working with UNHCR to 
maximise the granting of  effective protection to Palestinians in 1995-1996 
raises questions regarding the organisation’s absence in 2011. 
Following the 1995-1996 mass expulsions, an unknown number of  
Palestinians eventually returned to Libya in search of  work, but found 
themselves in a highly tentative and uncertain situation; thousands report-
edly stayed in an irregular status, fearful of  renewing their work permits 
and engaging with the Libyan authorities.65 Such fears are grounded in an 
acute awareness of  the vulnerability of  Palestinians in the country, as the 
1995-1996 episode was neither the first nor only instance of  Palestinian 
expulsion from Libya: hundreds of  Palestinian migrant-workers were 
expelled in March 1971,66 while more recently, in March 2007, Gaddafi 
had once again threatened to deport all Palestinians to Gaza ‘in retaliation 
for the latest Arab peace initiative’.67
This example therefore illustrates the extent to which UNHCR has an 
established history of  engaging in protection activities for populations with 
overlapping statuses as ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ migrants, in addition 
to highlighting the ongoing vulnerability experienced by Palestinian refu-
gees in the region. 
5. Continuity of  Protection: what, where and who?
Following the outbreak of  conflict in Libya in 2011, a number of  ‘solutions’ 
were sought and implemented by the international community for these 
 62  Goddard, above n 35, 501-2.
 63  Cited in al-Majdal, above n 33, 47.
 64  Goddard, above n 35, 504.
 65  Telephone interview, Benghazi resident, Apr 2011; telephone interview, Benghazi resident, Sept 
2011; personal communication, relative of  Palestinian refugee in Tripoli, Apr 2011. Further research 
is required to substantiate these claims.
 66  WA Otman and E Karlberg, The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning 
(Springer, 2007), 36.
 67  R Nahmias, ‘Libya threatens to deport Palestinian refugees to Gaza’, YNet (17 Mar 2007).
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‘invisible’ refugee populations formerly based in Libya. When examining 
the situation, two main related questions arise: what can be considered to 
be ‘effective protection’, and who can be considered to hold a responsibil-
ity to protect these populations: the refugees’ political representatives (the 
Polisario Front and PLO/Palestinian Authorities respectively), UNHCR, 
UNRWA (in the case of  Palestinians), the international community, or for-
mer and current host countries?
5.1 Protecting Sahrawi refugees 
In the context of  the relatively small total number of  Sahrawi refugees 
(approximately 900), and the existence of  one, active asylum host state 
(Algeria), evacuating Sahrawis from Libya has appeared to be more fea-
sible than offering protection to up to 70,000 Palestinians previously based 
across the region. In this instance, on 7 March 2011, the Sahrawi Press 
Service (SPS) reported the return of  ‘some 916 Sahrawi students who pur-
sued their secondary and university education and vocational training in 
Libya’ to the Sahrawi refugee camps on 5 March.68 SPS was informed by 
the Sahrawi Minister of  Education, Mariem Salek Hmada, that:
All the Sahrawi students in Libya, including girls, arrived safe and healthy in the 
Sahrawi refugee camps … The students have been repatriated under good condi-
tions and without incident.69
The evacuation of  Sahrawi children from Libya by the Sahrawi’s host state, 
Algeria, and their ‘repatriation’ to the refugee camps leads us to ask: to 
what extent can protection needs be considered to be upheld when refugee 
children who have experienced secondary displacement by armed conflict 
are returned to a desert-based refugee camp? Indeed, can return to a refu-
gee camp be considered to be a ‘solution’ in such a context? Furthermore, 
given that ‘repatriation’ refers to the return of  an individual or group to 
her/his country of  origin (the Latin prefix re- indicating a movement ‘back’ 
and patria meaning ‘native land’), is it appropriate to use such a term in 
this context? If  ‘repatriation’ is not considered to be appropriate or accu-
rate (since the refugee camps are not these children’s ‘country of  origin’), 
what alternative conceptualisations exist to capture such complex dynam-
ics? These issues require further investigation, drawing on both Sahrawi 
refugees’ and UNHCR’s perceptions of  ‘safety’, ‘effective protection’ and 
‘solutions’.
Another set of  questions pertains to the responsibility of  diverse actors 
to offer these children international protection. As indicated above, the 
Sahrawi students were ultimately evacuated by the Algerian authorities, 
 68  S El-Hafed, ‘Return to Sahrawi refugee camps of  Sahrawi students in Libya’, Sahrawi Press Service 
(7 Mar 2011).
 69  El-Hafed, ibid (emphasis added).
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who reportedly liaised with Polisario to enable the children’s return to their 
host state. However, it is notable that Spanish civil society also played a 
highly active role in lobbying Polisario to push for the children’s evacua-
tion: Spanish families host up to 10,000 Sahrawi children a year as part 
of  the Holidays in Peace programme,70 and many of  these children have 
subsequently travelled to Libya to complete their secondary and tertiary 
studies. In 2011, Spanish civil society also established numerous campaigns 
to mobilise public and political support71 for the evacuation of  these chil-
dren and adolescents, including blogs such as <http://www.saharaponent.
net/2011/02/estudiantes-saharauis-en-libia.html>, which actively traced 
the whereabouts of  Sahrawi refugee children in Libya, disseminating infor-
mation to interested Spanish individuals and families, and sharing opinions 
regarding Polisario’s management of  the crisis. Such initiatives were recog-
nised by Polisario in a number of  ways. For instance, shortly after the out-
break of  violence, the Polisario representative to Madrid is reported to have 
stated that: ‘the Sahrawi adolescents who are studying in Libya are “safe”’, 
reiterating that ‘the Sahrawi authorities have not considered an evacuation 
plan “yet”’.72 These statements were made as a ‘response’ to the ‘concerns 
demonstrated by various Spanish families who, years ago, hosted some 
of  these young Sahrawis when they were children’.73 Spanish civil society 
therefore felt a responsibility not only to trace the situation of  Spanish citi-
zens affected by the conflict in Libya, but also that of  one particular refugee 
group with whom they had a long-standing connection. Despite their initial 
dismissal of  an evacuation plan, Polisario ultimately secured the evacuation 
of  these children and adolescents; whether pressure applied by Spanish civil 
society played a role in securing this outcome, and precisely how Polisario 
and Algeria negotiated this ‘solution’, remains to be explored. 
Upon the children’s departure, UNHCR reported that they had been 
‘informed’ of  the evacuation of  753 Sahrawi from Benghazi on an Algerian 
boat.74 This leads us to question why UNHCR was ‘informed’ rather than 
more proactively involved in (if  not responsible for) their evacuation? 
Indeed, given that no UNHCR statistical or annual reports have recorded 
the number of  Sahrawi refugee children in Libya (unlike the detailed sta-
tistics vis à vis Sahrawis in Cuba), to what extent was UNHCR in fact 
aware of  the presence, whereabouts, total number and protection needs 
of  these refugee children in Libya? Whilst noting that UNHCR’s office in 
 70  G Crivello and E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘The Ties that Bind: Sahrawi Children and the Mediation 
of  Aid in Exile’ in Chatty and Findlay (eds), above n 11, 83-116.
 71  On Spanish civil society’s ‘responsibility’ to protect Sahrawi children and women, see Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, When the Self, above n 11.
 72  Quoted on <http://www.publico.es>, author’s translation.
 73  ibid.
 74  No further details are available to confirm which of  the two numbers of  Sahrawi evacuees reported 
by Polisario (916) or to/by UNHCR (753) is correct.
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Tripoli had been forced to suspend its operations twice in June 2010, and 
that its ‘engagement on protection issues in the country [was] fragile’75 and 
was ‘substantially constrained even before the current crisis’76 beyond its 
operational capacity, a broader question is whether UNHCR considers 
itself  to be responsible for the protection of  these refugees, as they were in 
the past in the case of  Cuban-based Sahrawi students.77 
5.2 Protecting Palestinian Refugees
Although the presence of  Sahrawi refugees in Libya had remained largely 
unnoticed by the international community (with the exception of  Spanish 
audiences) until their evacuation in April 2011, the UN, United States 
Department of  State (USDOS) and OCHA regularly documented the 
numbers of  Palestinians attempting to cross the Libyan-Egyptian bor-
der, those prevented from doing so, and those evacuated to a number of  
contexts. UNHCR regularly included such details under the ‘protection’ 
heading of  its reports, denoting its concern for Palestinians displaced by 
the conflict and, in one instance, included a photograph with the cap-
tion: ‘UNHCR staff talks to a Palestinian family stranded at the Egyptian-
Libyan border’.78 By 18 May, ‘some 655 Palestinians’ had been supported 
by UNHCR,79 by 20 May, OCHA had provided ‘protection counseling 
… to 30 Palestinians aiming to leave Libya’,80 and, by 3 June, ‘UNHCR 
has also helped 765 Palestinians stranded in a no man’s land to travel to 
Gaza, through the Rafah border crossing, in Egypt’.81 Table 3 presents 
a summary of  the figures provided by international organisations vis à 
 75  UNHCR Global Appeal 2011 Update, 89.
 76  UNHCR, ‘Refugee protection in countries affected by recent events in the Arab World’, UNHCR 
Press Release (23 June 2011).
 77 Although beyond the scope of  this article, the author would argue that this case-study parallels a 
broader disconnect between Sahrawi refugees and the UN agency, as embodied by UNHCR’s fail-
ure to protect Sahrawi refugee girls reportedly ‘abducted’ by their birth-families whilst fostered in 
Spain. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, When the Self, above n 11. In turn, while Algeria’s intervention to evacuate 
the Sahrawi children and youth from Libya could be interpreted as a ‘normal’ part of  its respon-
sibilities as the Sahrawi’s asylum state, it is notable that Algeria has in the past explicitly refused to 
accept that it is legally responsible for the human rights of  Sahrawi refugees, as the Sahrawi’s ‘host 
state’ and de-jure authority over the camps. Rather, Algeria ‘holds that it bears no responsibility with 
regard to the human rights situation of  the Sahrawi people’, since it recognises the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic’s jurisdiction and, in effect sovereignty, over the camps. OHCHR, ‘Report of  
the OHCHR Mission to Western Sahara and the Refugee Camps in Tindouf  – 15/23 May and 19 
June 2006’ (8 Sept 2006) 13; see also Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘Transnational Abductions and Transnational 
Responsibilities? The politics of  “protecting” female Muslim refugees abducted from Spain’, Gender, 
Place and Culture (forthcoming).
 78  UNHCR, ‘Update no 16: Humanitarian Situation in Libya and the Neighbouring Countries’ (4 
Apr 2011).
 79  UNHCR, ‘Update no 25: Humanitarian Situation in Libya and the Neighbouring Countries’ (18 
May 2011).
 80  OCHA, ‘Libyan Arab Jamahiriya – Crisis, Situation Report No 38’ (20 May 2011).
 81  UNHCR, ‘Update no 27: Humanitarian Situation in Libya and the Neighbouring Countries’ (3 
June 2011).
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vis Palestinians displaced from/in Libya in their public reports published 
between 1 March 2011 and 20 October 2011. UNHCR, USAID and 
OCHA reports and updates were analysed throughout the duration of  
the conflict, with no references to Palestinians identified in the updates 
produced from the end of  May to the execution of  Gaddafi on 20 October 
2011.
As in 1995-1996, this table highlights the extent to which the Salloum 
border has once again witnessed mass population movements, and major 
restrictions on Palestinians’ attempts to cross the Libyan-Egyptian border 
to seek safety. The figures provided by international agencies are, however, 
limited, reflecting inconsistencies between agencies (OCHA and UNHCR 
figures are widely divergent for 12 April and 19 April, for instance), 
and failing to systematically refer to the demography of  the Palestinians 
affected (such as gender, age and family structure) or, indeed, their legal 
status. The data presented by these agencies fails to elucidate precisely how 
many Palestinians have ‘successfully’ left Libya, and how many, and who 
(that is, gender, age and point of  origin) have remained internally stuck 
and why. While such an examination is beyond the scope of  this article 
(largely due to an absence of  reliable data), in the following section there is 
a preliminary assessment of  the ‘solutions’ which have been implemented 
and suggested to date.
First, with reference to the evacuation of  Palestinian students from 
Libya, the Palestinian Ambassador in Tripoli (Atif  Mustafa Auda) 
informed the media that by 6 March 2011 all 104 Palestinian refugee-
students who were attending university and military academies in Libya 
at the time had been evacuated from the country.82 While the Palestinian 
Ambassador is cited as declaring that the evacuation of  the Palestinian 
students had been ordered by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas,83 
the students themselves have contested this account in the media, claim-
ing that the Palestinian Authority failed to evacuate the students, with 
Jordan having reportedly offered to transport them alongside their own 
citizens, even if  they did not hold Jordanian Travel Documents.84 It must 
be acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority, like the Polisario Front, 
has limited resources, as stressed by Nidhal Abu Dukhan (the Palestinian 
military intelligence director) to Ma’an News Agency, which reports that 
he, ‘added that the Palestinian Authority did not have the capabilities to 
evacuate its nationals, as other countries have done’.85 A comparison of  the 
ways in which Polisario and Algeria on the one hand, and the Palestinian 
Authorities and Jordan on the other, have addressed the protection needs 
 82  Ma’an, above n 26.
 83  ibid.
 84  ibid, nn 26 & 28.
 85  ibid, above n 28.
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of  their respective ‘refugee populations’ would offer a fruitful opportunity 
to explore the interactions between refugees, their political representatives, 
and states that may or may not consider themselves to have a responsibility 
towards these populations.
Secondly, while all Sahrawi refugees were evacuated by one interna-
tional actor (the Algerian government) to one location (the Algerian-
based Sahrawi refugee camps), precisely where Palestinian refugees 
should, could, or might want to be safely evacuated to, and by whom, is 
a much more complex issue. This is especially true in the case of  those 
Palestinians who had been registered by UNHCR or who had been 
offered refugee status or complementary protection in Libya, and also vis 
à vis the tens of  thousands of  ‘refugee migrant workers’ for whom Libya 
has been their country of  habitual residence for up to, and sometimes 
over, twenty years. It is questionable whether the international com-
munity should expect, or can responsibly allow, Palestinians to ‘return’ 
to Gaza, the refugee camps in Lebanon, or to the explosive situation 
in Syria, where Syrian forces attacked a Palestinian refugee camp near 
Latakia (North-East Syria) on 15 August 2011, displacing over 5,000 
Palestinians.86 The viability of  a refugee camp setting providing effective 
protection thus emerges in both the Sahrawi and Palestinian contexts; 
paralleling the critique of  references to Sahrawis’ ‘repatriation’ to the 
Algerian-based camps, the conceptualisation of  Palestinians’ ‘return’ 
to Gaza is undermined by the assertion that most of  the forty-eight 
Palestinians who arrived in Gaza on 23 April were ‘Palestinian refugees 
working in Libya, few have ever visited Gaza’.87
Proposals for Palestinians to be ‘returned’ or ‘resettled’ within the region 
are highly problematic given historical and contemporary restrictions on 
 86  ‘Munazamat al-tahrir tudin fi shidda iqtiham mukhayyam al-Raml wa tahjir sukanihi’ (The PLO strongly 
denounces the al-Raml camp incursion and the displacement of  its people), Dar Al-Hayat (16 Aug 
2011); ‘Syria assault on Latakia drives 5,000 Palestinians from refugee camp’, The Guardian (15 
Aug 2011). Addressing the vulnerability of  Palestinians in Syria in the summer of  2011, UNRWA’s 
Commissioner General, Filippo Grandi, noted that ‘In Yarmouk in June, Hama in July and Latakia 
in August, the violence extended into the camps with tragic consequences for Palestine refugees’: F 
Grandi, ‘Waiting for solutions in uncertain times: Palestine refugees in the Middle East context’ (2011), 
Barbara Harrell-Bond Lecture, Refugee Studies Centre, University of  Oxford, 16 Nov 2011. At the 
time of  going to press (5 Mar 2012), violence in Syria has continued to escalate, with increasing reports 
of  Palestinians being detained, abused and killed, including in Yarmouk camp (Damascus) on 29 Feb 
2012: ‘Syrian regime said to target Palestinians who won’t fight uprising’, World Tribune (4 Mar 2012).
 87  ‘8th group successfully evacuated from Libya’, Ma’an News Agency (24 Apr 2011) (emphasis added). 
Further challenges emerge with reference to family unity and family reunification, since the members 
of  a given Palestinian family may hold travel documents or passports from different and distant coun-
tries, or no travel document or identity document at all. See Shiblak, above n 35, 44; Palestine Red 
Crescent Society, ‘Palestinian families stuck on the Libyan-Tunisian borders urge PRCS to intervene 
to help them return home’, ReliefWeb report (31 Mar 2011); ‘Palestinians in Libya leave for Gaza’, Ma’an 
News Agency (21 Apr 2011); ‘18 more Palestinians leave Libya’, Ma’an News Agency (7 Apr 2011); ‘From 
Libya, Palestinians return home to Gaza’, Ma’an News Agency (13 Apr 2011); OCHA, ‘Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya – Crisis, Situation Report No 35’ (9 May 2011).
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Palestinians’ movement, and, arguably, the impossibility for Palestinians 
to effectively locally integrate in host countries in a way that is consistent 
with international human rights frameworks. Indeed, it is worth recalling 
that in the context of  the 1995-1996 crisis, Gaddafi explicitly justified his 
actions as follows: 
And as I care about the Palestinian cause, and in order to achieve the best 
interest of  Palestinians, I will expel the thirty thousand Palestinians who cur-
rently live in my land, and try to secure their return to Gaza and Jericho. If  Israel would 
not let them in, while Egypt does not allow them to pass through its territories, 
then I shall set a great camp for them on the Egyptian-Libyan borders [that is, 
Salloum].88 
In line with Gaddafi’s highly paradoxical conceptualisation of  ‘protec-
tion’, Palestinians’ expulsion from Libya is presented as a means of  secur-
ing ‘their return to Gaza and Jericho’, with the name of  the ‘great camp’ 
established at the Salloum border clearly centralising the Palestinian right 
of  return: Mukhayyam Al-Awda (the Return Camp). In effect, Gaddafi’s 
strategy in 1995-1996 was, ostensibly, to draw attention to Palestinians’ 
inability to return to Gaza and Jericho, utilising the mass concentration 
of  highly visible Palestinians at the border to challenge the political status 
quo. It could be argued that the 2011 crisis, which was not orchestrated by 
Gaddafi but which was equally characterised by thousands of  Palestinians’ 
inability to cross the Libyan borders to Tunisia or Egypt, even when hold-
ing valid travel documents, visibly demonstrates the ongoing vulnerability 
faced by Palestinians in the region. Their experience of  the parallel pro-
cesses of  conflict-induced displacement and conflict-induced immobility, 
accompanied by an unprecedented degree of  violence, can be seen as an 
instance of  history repeating itself, yet again.89 
5.3 Alternative solutions: resettlement?
In light of  the major difficulties in securing effective protection for 
Palestinian refugees within the Middle East and North Africa, illustrated 
by the historical examples explored above, and currently exacerbated by 
the ongoing political instability across the region, the possible solution of  
resettlement outside the region for Palestinians affected by the Libyan con-
flict appears pivotal. Indeed, long-standing barriers to Palestinian refugees’ 
ability to adequately ‘locally integrate’ into host countries in the region, 
and their fluctuating vulnerability, have previously justified the resettle-
ment of  Palestinians to third countries outside the region, as evidenced in 
the precedent of  the resettlement of  ex-Iraqi Palestinian refugees ‘stuck’ 
 88  Quoted by Sirhan in al-Majdal, above n 33, 46 (emphasis added).
 89  Also see A Badwan, ‘Al-qalaq al-mutazayid wa haal al-filistiniyin fi libia’ (Growing concern for the situ-
ation of  Palestinians in Libya), Al-Quds (28 Mar 2011).
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at the Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Jordanian borders.90 However, in the case of  
Iraqi Palestinian refugees, between 2006 and 2008 only 381 Palestinian 
refugees were resettled from the Syrian and Jordanian borders with Iraq, 
during which period they, and several thousand other Palestinian refugees, 
were ‘stuck’ in one of  three camps on the border.91 Given the delays expe-
rienced by Iraqi Palestinians in the recent past, it is essential that such 
delays are not repeated in the aftermath of  the 2011 Uprisings, with the 
UN reasserting ‘the need to identify solutions to resettle some 1,000 third 
country nationals (mostly Iraqis and Palestinians) at Libya’s borders with 
Egypt and Tunisia who do not wish to return to their countries’.92 Despite 
such statements, however, it is notable that references to resettlement have 
rarely explicitly referred to Palestinians and typically include figures that 
underestimate the overall population for whom resettlement emerges as 
the only viable means of  securing an effective durable solution. 
It is equally concerning that, on 21 October 2011, one day after the cap-
ture and execution of  Colonel Gaddafi in Sirte, the UNHCR announced 
that new arrivals at the Salloum border would no longer be processed for 
resettlement, as of  Sunday 23 October 2011. It justified this decision as 
being, ‘based on a marked improvement in the situation in eastern Libya, 
and because UNHCR is refocusing its protection and assistance efforts 
inside Libya including RSD and resettlement’.93 It gave reassurance that 
the more than 1,800 people ‘already at Saloum will not be affected and 
work will continue on finding solutions for them, including resettlement 
for those found to be refugees’.94 However, precisely who will be prioritised 
for resettlement at the border and inside Libya itself, by which states and 
how soon, remains to be explored, as do the inevitable challenges that will 
be presented by state and non-state actors who reject even the prospect of  
resettlement of  Palestinians outside the region. A balance must therefore 
be achieved and maintained between the individual and collective protec-
tion needs of  Palestinian refugees, and the geopolitical interests of  diverse 
actors, including Middle Eastern and North African states, the Palestinian 
Authorities, international organisations such as UNHCR and UNRWA, 
and potential resettlement states themselves. While concerns will inev-
itably be raised that resettlement outside the region would jeopardise 
 90  See Goddard, above n 35, 502. In 2003, the UNHCR estimated that the total population of  
Palestinians in Iraq was 34,000, with 23,000 of  these having registered with the UN refugee agency: 
UNHCR, Briefing Notes, ‘Iraq: Mortar attack targets Baghdad Palestinians’ (20 Oct 2006). 
 91  ‘UN closes Palestinian refugee camp straddling Iraqi-Syrian border’, UN News Centre (2 Feb 2010); 
also Jordan, ‘U.S. Agrees to Resettle Palestinians Displaced by Iraq War’, The Wall Street Journal (17 
July 2009).
 92  OCHA, ‘Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah – Crisis, Situation Report No 15’ (22 Mar 2011) (emphasis 
added).
 93  UNHCR, Briefing Notes, ‘Resettlement programme ends at Egypt’s Saloum as Libya crisis wanes’ 
(21 Oct 2011).
 94  ibid.
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Palestinians’ right of  return, it is essential that Palestinians themselves have 
the opportunity to take decisions vis à vis the best means to secure effective 
protection for themselves and their families, rather than having decisions 
and ‘solutions’ presented by diverse actors on their behalf. 
6. Conclusion
This article has explored the challenges faced by Sahrawi and Palestinian 
refugees who were studying and working in Libya at the start of  the con-
flict in February 2011, and the nature and implications of  the interna-
tional community’s responses to these challenges. This article has argued 
that refugees who engage in ‘voluntary migration’ must not be concep-
tualised as having lost their claims to the refugee label, suggesting that a 
new conceptual framework of  ‘overlapping’ and ‘multiple’ refugeehoods 
may be appropriate in such circumstances. Having outlined a range of  
historical and contemporary scenarios of  mass expulsion and conflict-
induced displacement within and from Libya, in addition to highlighting 
the ‘overlapping invisibility’ of  Sahrawis and Palestinians as refugees in 
Libya throughout the 1990s and 2000s, this article has argued that refu-
gees’ agency in developing mobile educational and livelihood strategies 
may be paralleled by fluctuating vulnerabilities arising from local, national 
or international conflicts. In order to recognise the potential simultaneity 
of  refugees’ agency and a range of  overlapping vulnerabilities, this article 
has argued in favour of  new hyphenated categories including ‘refugee-stu-
dent’ and ‘refugee-migrant-worker’, whilst also noting the extent to which 
refugees may become ‘internally displaced refugees’ unable to leave con-
flict situations such as Libya.
The particular difficulties and dangers experienced by mobile refugees, 
including refugee children and youth engaging in educational migration 
or accompanying their ‘refugee-migrant-worker families’, raise particu-
larly important questions apropos the viability of  mobility itself  being pro-
posed by policy-makers as a feasible ‘durable solution’ for refugees. Indeed, 
the case-studies examined in this article illustrate the urgency of  assessing 
the protection mechanisms in place to support refugees who ‘voluntar-
ily’ migrate for economic and educational purposes. Such an assessment 
must include an evaluation of  which state and non-state actors could or 
should accept the responsibility to protect diverse refugee populations; pre-
cisely which ‘solutions’ can be considered to be appropriate and effective 
in addressing (rather than reproducing) protection gaps; and how refugees’ 
own preferences can be taken into account throughout decision making 
processes.
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